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   Any comparison of the introduction of modern technology or of the 
emergence of a modern infrastructure in the industries of Japan and the 
Ottoman empire c. 1700-1900 inevitably would be an unfavorable one for the 
Ottoman case. After all, Japan succeeded and the Ottoman empire failed. In the 
20th century, after the period of interest to us here, the Japanese state and its 
industrial economy based on large scale production flourished, while the 
Ottoman one collapsed and disappeared from the face of the earth. Indeed, Japan 
is the paradigmatic example of successful high-technology industrialization 
outside of the "New Europes", that is, beyond Western Europe and the states 
outside the European continent inhabited by significant populations of 
Europeans, such as the United States and Australia.' 
   In seeking to find the path to successful industrial modernization, 
contemporary states have examined the Japanese, not the Ottoman model. Let 
me pause here and ask if, after all the specifics are added up, we can actually 
understand why Japan succeeded in its industrialization? Although analysts 
have compiled formidable lists for Japan's success-for example, the devel-
opment of very strong group identity-the answer, probably, is no. Noting the 
presence of such variables describes Japan's triumphs, but really does not, in my 
view, explain them. In any event, it is important to remember that Japan was the 
anomaly and the Ottoman empire was the norm; Japan's example was atypical, 
while the Ottoman record of industrialization was the more typical one for 
nations outside the "New Europes" during the 19th century. In other words, 
might not Ottoman industrialization represent how manufacturing changes 
actually occurred across the 18th-19th century globe, while the Japanese case 
stands for the way that developmental economists believed it ought to have 
occurred ? 
   In the remarks that follow, I seek to realize two goals : 1) a description of 
some of the factors affecting Ottoman achievement of a technologically 
advanced, comparatively capital-intensive industrial sector ; 2) a challenge to 
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the way that most economists, developmentalists, and historians of Japan and 
the Ottoman empire have approached the question of industrialization.'
Factors affecting Ottoman industry 
   Let me begin with the character of the Ottoman empire as the centuries-old 
mortal enemy of many European states. Did Western European enmity, 
mistrust, and fear of the Ottoman retard the transfer of industrial technology 
that might add to the political and military strength of an ancient foe? Probably 
not, since the evidence demonstrates that information and equipment moved 
readily from Western Europe to the Ottoman empire. There is abundant 
documentation concerning the flow of military technology during the 18th and 
especially the 19th century into Ottoman lands. Indeed, the Ottoman state 
effortlessly obtained the desired military technology, and even exploited 
rivalries among European states to do so. In the late 19th century, for example, 
naval assistance came from the British, and army aid from Britain's noisy new 
rival, the German Reich. We find the the same ease of transfer to be true in 
regards to manufacturing technology. The initial Ottoman adoption of many of 
the various industrial technologies frequently occurred shortly after their 
discovery or development in Western Europe. Indeed, one of the impressive 
features of Ottoman industrial technology transfer during the 19th century is its 
immediacy. Scarcely had a West European development occurred than one or 
another entrepreneur adopted it in an Ottoman context. And, I hasten to add, I 
do not mean only official state adoption of technologies, but also that by private 
individuals, both Ottoman and foreign. The list of transfers to Ottoman lands 
that took place within just a few years of their invention in Europe (or America) 
is a long one, and includes examples such as the railroad, the steamship, 
techniques involving cloth finishing, innovations in silk spinning, as well as the 
(Singer) sewing machine. Clearly, the channels for transmitting the technologies 
were both open and in use. 
   The problem was not in the exploratory adoption of a new technology, but 
instead in its proliferation. It must be said that the Ottoman industrial 
infrastructure was not impressive, in the sense that there were few large-scale 
factories employing capital-intensive equipment and substantial numbers of 
workers. The relatively-few factories of this type were concentrated in several 
urban centers such as Salonica, Istanbul, Bursa, and Izmir, as well as the Adana 
area, and focused mainly on textiles and food processing. During the 18th and 
early 19th centuries, most factories were state built and supplied official needs 
(see below). Thereafter, plants were established with private funds, and became 
increasingly active and important as the 19th century wore on. Private, often
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merchant capitalized factories fall into two groups : 1) those supplying the needs 
of the port cities and the Istanbul capital, and 2) those serving the export market 
such as wool and silk spinning and tobacco processing. Altogether, Ottoman 
factories employing inanimate sources of power numbered not more than 
several hundreds and employed only a few tens of thousands of workers. 
Ottoman steam and internal combustion engines, for example, generated only 
two percent of the horsepower of factories in the Austro-Hungarian empire at 
the end of the century. Even countries that were quite backward by European 
standards-such as Spain and Russia-possessed industrial capabilities that 
towered over the Ottoman.
   Given that the new technologies were available and known in the Ottoman 
lands, we need to return to the international and domestic factors that checked 
their more widespread adoption. In the first place, there is this question of 
proximity to the West European birthplace of modern industrial technology. Of 
all the non-"Neo Europes", the Ottoman empire was closest to the West European 
lands in which massive, successful industrialization took root. On the one hand, 
we have seen that proximity facilitated the flow of ideas and technologies. On 
the other, closeness made it an early target for European manufacturers, who 
began dumping their goods on Ottoman shores back in the 16th and 17th 
centuries.' Such practices must have distorted Ottoman industrial evolution in 
a way that distant Japan did not experience. Later on, in the 18th and 19th 
centuries, proximity meant that Ottoman markets usually were the first to feel 
the impact of intra-European manufacturing changes. In balance, the geo-
graphical position of the Ottoman empire probably impeded the depth of 
Ottoman industrial development, even if it did not retard the speed of 
technology transfer. 
   Some of the factors affecting Ottoman industry were natural. Although the 
role of natural resources is a hotly debated issue, the presence of abundant water 
and human resources does seem important. Both water and people were quite 
scarce in most of the Ottoman lands, except for the Balkans (and in a few other 
limited regions). Not coincidentally, in areas where water sources and popu-
lations were most abundant, we find the greatest concentrations of Ottoman 
industry. 
   The overall lack of investment capital surely was important and we 
repeatedly find entrepreneurs with good ideas and knowledge of the technology 
being frustrated by scarce capital. The prospects for capital accumulation were 
reduced by the horizontal and vertical fragmentation of the Ottoman market 
among foreign and local merchants, spelling a decentralized and unintegrated 
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economy. Those few entrepreneurs with capital frequently invested it in ways 
that minimized risk (spreading it around in numbers of ventures), but also 
reduced the amount of capital available to a particular industry. Notably, 
foreign investors did not step in to fill the capital gap, as they did in many other 
regions of the globe during the 19th century. In Russia and the United States, for 
example, West European capital played a key, if not central role, in 19th century 
industrialization. But in the Ottoman empire, foreigners placed virtually all of 
their investments in the extractive or transportation sectors, not industry. In 
order to understand better why residents and foreigners invested in this manner, 
we must now turn to the issue of the Ottoman state and its impact. 
   The role of the state in economic development obviously is an important 
issue. On the one hand, Ottoman historians have given too much credit to the 
state, making it accountable for all the successes and failures of the economy. 
Entrapped in the government-generated documents that are their historical 
sources, they have seen the world through bureaucratic eyes and placed the state 
at literally the very center of things. In so doing, they have attributed to the 
Ottoman state, in both its pre-modern and more modern versions, capabilities 
that even late 20th century states do not possess. Even today, states do not have 
the economic impact that Ottoman historians attribute to the Istanbul regime of 
the 18th and 19th centuries. Although the role of the state has been over-
emphasized, some responsibility for the fate of Ottoman industrialization 
nonetheless does seem to rest here. 
   The state both stimulated and impeded technology transfer and industrial-
ization. On the positive side, we need to record that it founded most of the pre-
1870 factories and recruited hundreds of foreign technicians to run them. It also 
established technical and industrial schools, at first around Istanbul but later in 
the Anatolian, Arab, and European provinces. (A closer look at these schools 
reveals that the state's vision of industry often included only furniture making, 
shoemaking, and tailoring.) The central government also organized expositions 
to popularize and disseminate innovative technology, an example later followed 
by many provincial governments. In addition, it granted scores of favorable 
concessions to industrial entrepreneurs; in the second half of the period, it 
consistently awarded tax exemptions and other privileges to encourage 
industry. And, it launched numerous programs of industrial development 
during the first third of the century, in the 1860s-1870s, and just before World 
War I. In a series of measures that worked against guilds' control over urban 
workspaces, the state opened up the labor market, thus making workers more 
available for large factory employ.' 
   Other government policies and attitudes surely retarded the pace of
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technology transfer and industrial development. It needs to be said that 
virtually all of the modern, mechanized factories founded by the state were 
intended not as instruments of economic development, but rather as suppliers of 
governmental needs. Hence, the state primarily was following the dictates of 
economic policies (dating from the 18th century and earlier, and termed 
"provisionism" by Ottoman historians) aimed at self -sufficiency rather than 
development.' Tariff policies often seem similarly rooted in the past. The 
Ottoman regime, until late in the 19th century, retained or promoted tariff 
structures that were unfavorable to industry. While European pressure does 
help explain low import duties, they also originate in these earlier Ottoman state 
concerns to assure sufficient supplies of foodstuffs, raw materials, and other 
goods. The maintenance of high tariffs on the flow of goods within the empire, 
for its part, derives from other longstanding policies that used tariffs as income 
sources ("fiscalism"). The state's policies towards guilds-vigorous opponents of 
concentrated factory formation-also partially clung to values dating back to 
earlier centuries.' The regime vacillated, variously supporting and condemning 
monopolies that it officially had abolished early in the 19th century. Throughout 
that century, the state continuously was balancing the usefulness of guilds in 
domestic political life, considerations of equity, and the desire for more efficient 
production. Moreover, at least in the late 19th century, governmental fears over 
concentrations of workers in factories outweighed measures against guilds that 
increased the circulation of labor. During the reign of Abdul Hamid, the state 
was very suspicious of the concentrated workforce that factories required, and 
dragged its feet on industrial development.? 
   It also seems relevant to note that, during the 19th century, the Ottoman 
state apparatus grew relatively stronger as the Ottoman empire became 
progressively weaker. Unlike in Japan, the elites focused very little on the 
economy and more upon the replication of themselves. Consequently, the civil 
and military elites vastly expanded, but they gave very little attention to 
industrial change.
Small-scale Ottoman industry 
   Ottoman historical writing on industry generally has followed an 
intellectual tradition-one stressing big factory, highly-mechanized, capital-
intensive industry-with deep roots in both Western and Middle Eastern 
scholarship. Since the 1970s, however, research on European industrialization 
has stressed low-technology, labor-intensive forms of production (often rural) 
and the extended period over which the so-called "Industrial Revolution" 
occurred. This new scholarship emphasizes efficiencies not through mecha-
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nization but increased exploitation of labor as a key to understanding the 
industrial changes that occurred in the West during the 18th and 19th centuries. 
Studies demonstrated, for example, that British industrial growth derived from 
vast increases in production located in homes and workshops, and not merely in 
factories.' This framework of analysis, when brought to a study of Ottoman 
industry, makes clear that the manufacturing story presented so far is 
incomplete-that there is another chapter to be told. The Ottoman story of 
industrialization presented so far has been a dismal one, filled with shortcomings 
and unfinished transitions. But if we shift our focus from the big factory to the 
home and small workshop, and from the transfer of capital-intensive to that of 
less-expensive manufacturing technologies, a radically different and more 
complex picture emerges. In the Ottoman world, small-scale production in home 
and workshop-in both town and country-predominated. There, not in 
factories, is to be found most industrial production and the majority of Ottoman 
industrial workers during the 18th and also the 19th centuries. Big factories and 
large-scale production paled in importance before small-scale production, 
industry that was based on simpler technologies. 
   Also, most Ottoman industrial production aimed at the domestic market 
(unlike in Japan), although there are several notable exceptions. One of these 
was the silk reeling industry which, given its steam-powered, factory-based 
nature, was doubly exceptional. Unlike its Japanese counterpart, however, this 
industry was a minor factor in the international market. Another export-
focused example, the carpet making industry, typifies the Ottoman norm of 
small-scale enterprises scattered about in villages and towns. Otherwise, most 
Ottoman industries satisfied domestic consumers, in a dense network of trading 
channels that crisscrossed the empire. Also, it should be noted, fierce compe-
tition among Ottoman producers for the domestic market is an important feature 
of its industrial sector. 
   The most common industrial technologies transferred to the Ottoman lands 
shared three features. First, they were inexpensive to buy; second, they were 
simple to use; equally significant, they were labor saving in nature. Like pieces 
of a puzzle, the strengths of these transfers matched well with the weaknesses 
of the Ottoman economy that was lacking in capital, technologically un-
sophisticated, and chronically short of labor. Notable examples of cheap, simple 
labor-saving technologies drawn from the textile sector are machine-made yarn, 
synthetic dyes, and sewing machines. An analogous example from the agrarian 
sector includes the cheap, simple and efficient McCormack reaper from the 
United States. Ottoman manufacturers adopted these humbler products of 
European origin-which sometimes were developed from highly sophisticated
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and extremely expensive technologies-in their competitive struggle 
survival with domestic and international competitors. These kinds 
technology transfers played a key role in the evolution and continuation 





   In their assessments of Ottoman industry and its viability, contemporaries 
and subsequent observers too often focused only on the paucity of big factories 
and on the failure to industrialize according to this model. Thus, they spoke of 
the Bomonti brewery, the Istanbul flour mills, the tanneries and macaroni 
factories, the state-run shipyard and the various arsenals, the cotton mills of 
Adana, the railroad repair yards at Eskisehir, and the silk spinning mills of 
Bursa. They concluded that the low numbers of such factories meant that 
Ottoman industry was moribund, declining in an age of mass Western 
industrialization. Instead, I argue, a host of factors-natural and man-made, 
domestic and international-gave 18th and 19th century Ottoman industry a 
particular shape. It seems more constructive and useful to see Ottoman 
manufacturing not as a failed industrialization, but rather one that, within a 
given set of parameters, followed a particular trajectory. 
   However interesting, large-scale enterprises form a minor portion of total 
Ottoman industrial output and its workforce, and are only part of the overall 
story of Ottoman manufacturing. The bulk of the industries that survived into 
the early 20th century were of the type least visible to the observer, and thus too 
often have gone unnoticed. These were small-scale in nature, hidden away in 
small workshops and homes and, to boot, staffed largely by female workers. 
Aimed at domestic consumers and often marked by putting out networks that 
were not easy for a state to tax or an observer to see, small enterprises pulsed 
with life and vitality throughout the late Ottoman period. While some faded 
away and succumbed to foreign competition, many did not. Instead, Ottoman 
artisans and merchants shifted marketing strategies and production techniques 
and continued to compete against domestic and international rivals. Such 
modest endeavors underlay the story of industrial production and its ongoing 
transformations in the final Ottoman centuries.
Notes 
1. The term is from Alfred W. Crobsy, Jr., Ecological imperialism : the biological expansion of Europe, 
  900-1900 (Cambridge, 1986). 
2. Earlier versions of many of the arguments traced below are presented in my Manufacturing and
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  turing the age of the industrial revolution (Cambridge, 1993), esp. 1-5 and 161-177. 
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  source cited therein. 
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